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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we construct a model of a policy game in order to analyse the optimal reaction function of 
the Central Bank to a shock in the asset market. In doing so, we consider three different non-
cooperative games: Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium with “FED” as leader and “ECB” 
Stacklberg as leader. Three major conclusions can be drawn from our work in the presence of asset 
market shocks. First, in the Nash equilibrium the ECB will adopt a less restrictive monetary policy 
compared to the FED’s behaviour. Second, comparing the Nash and Stackelberg non-cooperative 
equilibria, the Stackelberg solution is certainly superior when the FED is the leader, but the Nash 
solution is superior for the follower. Finally, irrespective of where the shocks originate, if the FED 
would choose the Stackelberg leader equilibrium the ECB would minimize its social loss along with a 
lower level of interest rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse interactions among monetary policymakers in the 
presence of shocks in asset markets.  This analysis will be undertaken in the contest of a 
simple theoretical game with no uncertainty. In this framework the concepts of co-ordination, 
co-operation and commitment between two countries are fundamental in the evaluation of the 
resulting policy rules that will emerge under different behavioural assumptions regarding the 
relationship of the monetary authorities with each other.  
In particular, we address the following issues: the impact on the Central Bank’s policy 
response to a shock in the asset market and how the resulting policy change in one country 
will affect both the Central Bank response and the asset market in the other country. 
The first step in providing answers to the question considered above is to describe how asset 
markets respond to a monetary policy change initiated either by the home or foreign Central 
Bank. It is evident that financial markets’ responses to monetary policy actions undertaken by 
either the home or foreign Central Bank depend on a combination of domestic and foreign 
influences. These influences manifest themselves through two channels. The first and most 
immediate relates to movements in the quoted prices such as exchange rates and interest rates 
in the international money, capital and foreign exchange markets. The second channel is due 
to changes in domestic real activity and prices. These channels have both direct effects and 
indirect effects on the economy, and the latter can partially or totally offset the initial effects 
of the former. For example, changes in equilibrium prices will affect both private incomes 
and wealth.  The existence of a wealth effects associated with asset market fluctuations has 
been analysed by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Goodhart and Hoffman (2000) and 
Mishkin (2001) and is beyond dispute. A fall in asset market prices due to restrictive 
monetary policy will erode personal wealth. In addition, lower asset prices are associated with 
lower private sector investment resulting in greater employment uncertainty and lower 
confidence, particularly because layoffs typically increase during such periods, so that 
individuals will stop spending. Since consumption represents a great percentage of GDP, even 
small changes in consumer spending could affect economic growth.  
Higher inflation due to lax monetary policy can have a negative impact on the asset market, 
because increasing inflation results in moderating long-term interest rates, thus reducing the 
present value of future profits. In addition, as higher inflation is normally associated with 
variable inflation, this has a further negative effect on the firms because typically it incites 
investors to demand higher risk premiums. This takes the form of increased spreads of 
corporate bond and commercial paper interest rates relative to Treasury yields. 
The present paper uses a formal model within a policy game in order to analyse an optimal 
reaction of the Central Bank to a shock in the asset market. We consider two countries, 
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“USA” and “Europe”, and different games in which we assume that both central banks react 
to a shock in their asset markets. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 reviews the literature.  The model is 
developed and the basic results are derived in section 3. Section 4 analyses the impact of 
shocks in the asset markets and their effects on monetary policy and discusses the welfare 
implications of different forms of non-cooperative behaviour. Section 5 contains the 
conclusions 
 
2. Review of the literature 
 
Beginning with early work by Hamada (1976), a large number of studies have analyzed 
strategic interactions between monetary authorities. It has been argued that cooperation is 
Pareto efficient (Carzoneri and Gray, 1985) but it is also well known that enforcing the 
cooperative outcome is unlikely (Persson and Tabellini, 1995). 
Hamada (1976 and 1985) analysed the interactions between monetary policy and exchange 
regimes. He conducted the analysis within a static monetary approach to the balance of 
payments with fixed exchange rates. In these models, it was shown that the non-cooperative 
solutions were inferior compared to the coordinated equilibrium, as the latter was located on 
the Pareto contract curve. This provides the classical argument for benefits from coordination 
in Hamada's (1976) seminal article: all countries could do better by agreeing not to try to 
export inflation. 
Canzoneri & Gray (1985) reached the conclusion that in regimes with externalities co-
ordination is desirable because of improved welfare for both countries than the Nash or 
Stackelberg equilibria. This result is derived by analysing the impact of the same exogenous 
shock in two groups of counties, the US and the rest of the world. However, they also showed 
that there is a special case in which non-cooperation is Pareto optimal. This is the case when, 
following a common supply shock in a symmetric model, one of the policymakers is acting as 
a fixed-exchange-rate leader. The paper of Walsh (1998) reaches similar conclusions. 
One of the most prominent critiques to this conclusion is that of Rogoff (1985), who showed 
that policy cooperation between countries may be counterproductive if there are domestic 
credibility problems. He augments a two-country model with a Barro-Gordon (1983) dynamic 
inconsistency problem, and shows that the cooperative outcome reduces welfare compared to 
the non-cooperative one when the policy commitment is considered infeasible by the private 
sector. Kehoe (1991), and Carraro and Giavazzi (1991) rejected Rogoff’s (1985) point of 
view, presenting a counter example. However in these models, there are questions about 
credibility and inter-temporal inconsistency, as the assumption of the existence of a common 
strategy between the private agents and the government cannot be justified. 
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In the last decade it has been recognised that asset prices play an important role in 
determining business cycles conditions. A significant impact can be found in the role that 
capital markets play in the modern economic environment. Their impact has gone beyond 
indirect intermediation; it has a direct effect on activity due to both the deepening and 
widening of the capital markets. The existence of a wealth effect associated with asset market 
fluctuations has been analysed by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Goodhart and Hoffman 
(1999) and Mishkin (2001) in the recent literature. In the Dynan and Maki (2001) study that 
analyses the response of individual households to changes in stock market wealth, it was 
found that, over the period 1983-1999, there was a positive relationship between spending of 
U.S. households that own stocks and movements in the stock market. A second study by Maki 
and Palumbo (2001) has estimated that, in the second half of the 1990s, US households with 
high levels of income showed the largest consumption increases, consistent with the fact that 
these households owned the most stocks and experienced the largest gains in wealth. 
Although the statistical link between asset prices and output is not well established (Poterba, 
2000, Poterba and Samwick, 1996), it is impossible to negate that an increasing part of 
households’ wealth is locked into the stock market and that at the same time the amount of 
firms’ external financing has increased as never before. With such a central role for asset 
prices, it is essential for the monetary authorities that pursue an inflation target to take them 
into consideration, as they will affect aggregate demand. This does not assert that the Central 
Bank should target asset prices, but it implies that they should be considered for their effect 
on inflation indirectly via their impact on private sector spending. 
In the subsequent section we will develop a model of strategic interaction between two 
monetary authorities and will allow for an explicit role of the asset markets in the structure of 
the economy in the light of the above discussion.  
 
3. The model 
 
Following the pioneering contributions of Hamada (1976, 1985), Canzoneri and Gray (1985), 
Cooper (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and more recently Lambertini (1998), 
Frowen and Karakitsos (2000) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2001), we develop a formal 
model within a policy game in order to analyse an optimal reaction of the Central Bank to a 
shock in the asset market. In doing this, we consider different games in which we assume that 
both central banks, Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (FED and ECB henceforth) 
react to a shock in their asset markets. 
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We assume that monetary policy is the result of equilibria of a policy game. Some games are 
co-operative and others non co-operative2. Central banks react to each other on the basis of 
some knowledge of the interdependence of their various policies. We consider three different 
games with various equilibria: the first two are based on Stackelberg equilibria, and the third 
is based on Nash equilibrium. In the first we consider that the Federal Reserve is the leader 
and the ECB is the follower. In the second we reverse the role. The third is based on a Nash 
equilibrium that implies also a non-co-operative solution3. 
 
The subsequent analysis is based on the following assumptions: 
 
1) The world exists for a single period or one-shot game and consists of two countries: 
“United States” and “Europe”;    
2) each central bank optimises an objective function that penalises deviations of 
inflation from target, and output gap. Of crucial importance is the weight that the 
central bank attaches to each component of the objective function. Hence, in the 
present paper the FED is assumed, according to its mandate, to be balanced in its 
pursuit of monetary policy and this implies that the weights attached to inflation and 
growth are the same; while, the ECB is tied by its narrow mandate to maintain price 
stability and this implies that the weight attached to inflation is higher than that of the 
FED;  
3) the impact of an increase in the price of imported raw materials (e.g. oil price) has a 
stronger impact on the European economy compared to the US economy; 
4) the spillover effect of the FED’s monetary policy on Europe is more pronounced  
than that of the ECB on the US; 
5) asset market fluctuations impact future consumption choices and consequently future 
rates of inflation; 
6) in accordance with Bernanke and Gertler (1999) we assume that central banks do not 
respond to asset prices movements unless they affect their inflation forecast; 
                                                          
2
 We adopt the terminology of Canzoneri and Henderson where coordination refers to the way policymakers settle on one 
solution out of several in a non-cooperative game. (1991, page 4) 
3
 In general, the problem with any cooperative game is that policymakers have an incentive to cheat. Implicit in any cooperative 
game structure is the ability of policymakers to commit to binding agreements. 
A comparison of the outcome of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with the equilibrium in which the policymakers 
cooperate, and the public expect cooperation, confirms the following proposition: 
Rogoff proposition: under complete information, policy cooperation lowers welfare. Hence, international policy cooperation is 
counterproductive. 
However, the above proposition has been criticized by Carraro and Giavazzi (1991). In fact, they affirm that is the policymakers 
have the choice to cooperate or not, the not-cooperative equilibrium is not sub-game perfect. The Carraro-Giavazzi proposition 
is: assume complete information. If the central bank can sign binding agreements to cooperate, the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium is not a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sequential game. 
The proof of the above proposition is that once the public has formed its expectation, there are only two players left. In this 
context, co-operation between them is unambiguously superior. 
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We present a simple symmetric model4 which is the static equivalent of a conventional 
aggregate demand –aggregate supply model augmented with the asset market. Hamada (1979) 
called this approach “strategic” because it “is based on the joint reactions and counteractions 
of each participating country”5.  
 
The model describing the US economy that the FED uses consists of the following6: 
 
( ) Xyy u11111 ααpipi +−+=         (1) 
( ) 111111 Srryy ββ +−−=         (2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1112221111 εγγγ +−+−−−−= yyrrrrS e       (3) 
 
Equation (1) is the Phillips curve where inflation ““ will increase or decrease relative to the 
target levelpi in response to positive/negative values of output and imported inflation. In the 
absence of shocks pi is also its expected value. 
Equation (2) links the output gap to the domestic interest rates and the asset market (S1). 
11 rr −  ( 1r∆  henceforth) is the deviation of the interest rate from its equilibrium value, that is, 
the value that ensures the Bank’s loss function is at the bliss point. 
Equation (3) describes the behaviour of the asset market. It allows for both the domestic and 
foreign interest rates to influence the value of the asset market7. Both interest rates (domestic 
and foreign) have a negative impact on the asset markets and this can be rationalized as 
follows. A rise in the domestic interest rate has a negative effect because higher interest rates 
decrease investment and subsequently aggregate demand. Meanwhile, a rise in the foreign 
interest rate will have a contractionary effect on the foreign economy thus reducing exports to 
that economy. The reduction in profits of the domestic firms will lead investors to expect a 
decrease in domestic asset prices. 
Moreover, in eq. (3) an increase in output will boost the profits of firms, which in turn causes 
an increase in the asset values. Finally, we consider an unexpected shock in the asset market 
denoted by (1). 
Under these assumptions, if a country is experiencing an unexpected increase in the value of 
the asset market, the central bank could use the interest rate (e.g. increase) in order to “cool 
down” the market. 
 
                                                          
4
 The size of the Europe economy is almost the same of the US economy. Hence, Europe and the United States are symmetric to 
each another. The structural parameters for the two countries are equal. 
5
 Hamada (1979), pag. 299. 
6
 Subscript 1 denotes FED and subscript 2 denotes ECB. 
7
 The fundamental question about the relation between interest rates and asset prices hinges on the relation between money 
tomorrow and money today. A stock share (or some other asset) represents a claim to receive some amount of money tomorrow. 
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The equivalent model for the EU used by the ECB is: 
 
( ) Xyy e12222 ααpipi +−+=         (4) 
( ) 212222 Srryy ββ +−−=         (5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2222111222 εγγγ +−+−−−−= yyrrrrS u       (6) 
 
Since we are assuming a symmetric model, equations (4)-(6) follow the same descriptions we 
made above. 
We assume that both shocks 1 and 2 are independent and identically distributed (iid) with 
zero mean and constant variance. An unexpected shock in the asset market implies a 
persistent deviation from its long-run equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
only policy makers can observe the shocks in real time. This allows us to avoid additional 
terms describing surprises for the economic agents.  
In each model the following restrictions apply. All the coefficients are positive but less than 
one. The following inequality, i,1γγ  , implies that domestic monetary policy has a larger 
impact on the domestic asset market than on the foreign one. The second inequality, 1ββ  , 
implies that the effect on output of domestic monetary policy exceeds the wealth. The third 
inequality ue 11 αα  implies that an increase in the price of raw materials has a greater impact 
on the European economy compared to the US. The fourth assumption regarding the 
comparative spillover effect is expressed by the following inequality, eu 11 γγ  . 
In both models the transmission of monetary impulses operates through one main channel: the 
interest rate.  More precisely, the effects of a monetary contraction have a negative impact on 
the domestic asset market. This causes a further decrease in output due to the wealth effect in 
addition to the contraction of aggregate demand. As output contracts domestic inflation 
decreases. 
 
The general form of the loss function of the central banks8 is given by: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]22
 
2
1
iiiiii yywL −+−= pipi        (7) 
 
where the subscript ‘i’ refers to the country. iw  is the degree of inflation aversion that 
policymakers attach to inflation. When iw  is one, the central bank is balanced in its pursuit of 
monetary policy with respect to the two conflicting targets of inflation and unemployment. 
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The higher the value of the weight ( iw ) associated with the inflation deviation, the greater the 
bank’s inflation aversion. y  denotes the potential output and pi  the inflation rate that 
corresponds to the potential output.  
The two bliss points are consistent with the level of potential output and inflation target such 
that [ ] 0,, == iiii ryfL pi . 
Subject to equation (7), each central bank optimises its own objective function with respect to 
the economic models, eq. (1)-(6), which allows for the interdependence of these economies. 
The optimal combination of policy instruments is achieved, for each country, when the loss 
function is maximized subject to the economic model. In this game, the choice of a single 
central bank is conditioned (taking as given) on the choices of the other. 
The following equation describes the optimal monetary policy for each country: 
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Equation (8) describes the solution and can be applied to all cases in the subsequent 
discussion. Substituting eq. (1)-(3) into eq.(7) and setting the partial derivative equal to zero 
as in eq.(8), yields the first- order condition and the following FED reaction function: 
 
2211 ArAr +∆=∆  (9) 
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Under the assumption that the model is defined as deviations from full employment, the loss 
function of the central banks should be equal to zero if there are no shocks in the system. That 
is, both economies are at their bliss points. 
The equivalent reaction function for the ECB is: 
 
2211 BrBr +∆=∆  (10) 
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From the above solution we derive the following conclusion: 
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  The model has been simplified somewhat here in order to focus on asset market. 
 9 
 
Proposition 1  
 
Given that 111 ;, ββγγγ  eu ; ue 11 αα   and eu 11 γγ  , the reaction function of  the ECB is 
steeper than the reaction function of the FED, and the ECB intercept lies above that of the 
FED. 
 
Proof: 
From equations (9) and (10) we compare the slopes and the intercepts of both reaction 
functions; given our assumptions ( 111 ;, ββγγγ  eu ; ue 11 αα   and eu 11 γγ  ) we conclude 
that for the intercepts the following inequality holds: 
 
γββ
γβ
γβ
γββ
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11
11
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+
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u
         (11) 
 
Furthermore, based on the same assumption the relationship between slopes is given by 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )( )γββα
ααγβ
γβα
ααγβ
γββ
β
γ 12
121
11
2
121
1
1
1 1
1
1
11
++
−
+
−
+
u
u
e
u w
w
and      (12) 
 
Once we have established the reaction functions of both countries and defined their relative 
forms, next step is to derive three equilibria as results of non-cooperative games. In doing so, 
we consider a one-shot game, but with the so-called “pre-play stage” (Lambertini and Rovelli, 
2003). This stage implies that both monetary authorities, before choosing the optimal level of 
their respective interest rates, have to make a preliminary decision regarding a non-
cooperative or cooperative game. “Assume that there are two instants, t1 and t2, at which the 
two authorities can move. These instants are purely logical entities, and do not belong to 
calendar time; they represent the pure strategies available to players at the first (pre-play) 
stage”9.  
The most interesting thing of the pre-play stage is that, if both authorities want to choose at 
the same instant (t1 or t2), the consequent equilibrium of the second stage is the Nash 
equilibrium. If, on the other hand, one authority chooses t1 while the other chooses t2, the final 
                                                          
9
 Lambertini and Rovelli, page 13, 2003. 
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solution in stage two will be a Stackelberg equilibrium with the country that has chosen t1 to 
act as leader10. 
 
3.1 Game1: Nash equilibrium 
In this section, each Central Bank is supposed to behave in a non-cooperative way, and to set, 
at the same instant, the policy on the basis of the objective function, without considering the 
consequences on the other players’ welfare.  
The Nash equilibrium point (N) is achieved through the intersection of eq. (9-10), solving we 
obtain: 
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and we deduce 
 
Proposition 2 Assume that the change in the price of raw materials is zero ( 0=X ). Then the 
following holds: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]
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Proof: 
given that 111 ;, ββγγγ  eu it follows that ( ) 0112121 ueγγβγββ −+ . This implies that, in a 
Nash game, it is possible to identify a wide range of shocks in the US asset market such that 
( ) ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ∞+
+++
 12
111
2
1
2
1
111111
2
12 εε
γββγβγβ
γββγβγββγγβ
eu
ueu
 for which the FED is forced to use a more 
restrictive monetary policy, compared to the ECB ( NN rr 21 ∆∆  ).  
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 “The extended game is a two-stage game where the first stage concerns the choice of timing, while the second stage is the 
proper policy game where policy instruments are to be set according to the sequence selected at the previous stage”,  Lambertini 
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3.3 Game2:  Stackelberg equilibria 
Under the Stackelberg regime, monetary authorities no longer act simultaneously. It is now 
assumed that one player (the Stackelberg leader) has a first-mover advantage when selecting 
policy, and takes into account the response of the other player (the follower) to the policy 
measures. Thus, the leader chooses the optimal strategy subject to the follower’s reaction 
function, and the follower’s committed response is to simply take the leader’s policy as given 
and minimise its loss. We think that the leader-follower policy regime is interesting in as 
much as it allows to highlight of the strategic aspects of the decision-making process in the 
context of differential inflation-aversion coefficients.  
In the Stackelberg equilibrium, monetary leadership is the usual way to capture the notion of 
central bank independence [Petit (1989), Hughes Hallett and Petit (1990), Debelle (1996)]. 
 
3.3.1 Stackelberg equilibrium with FED as leader 
 
The leader’s problem is: 
  ( ) ( )[ ]21121111  21min1 yywLr −+−=∆ pipi       (15)  
s.t.: 2211 BrBr +∆=∆  
where 1w , the weight that the FED attaches to inflation is unity because the US central bank 
is assumed, according to its mandate, to be “balanced” in its pursuit of monetary policy. 
Proceeding by substitution and setting the partial derivative with respect to 1r∆  of the leader’s 
objective function equal to zero, we obtain the first- order condition: 
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and Rovelli, page 13, 2003. 
 12 
where ( )Ω++=Ψ γββγγβ 11121 eu . 
 
From the above it follows: 
 
Proposition 3 Assume that the change in the price of raw materials is zero ( 0=X ). Then the 
following inequality holds: 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
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  when the FED acts as leader.  
 
Proof: 
Provided that ( )[ ]γββγγβγβ 1112111 +−ueu  is positive for all
ue 11
1
1 γγ
γβββ + , in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium with FED as leader, it is possible to identify a narrow range of shocks in the US 
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 such that 
FED’s monetary policy is less restrictive compare to its Nash equilibrium.  
A corollary of the above is that for this range of asset shocks the ECB’s policy when acts as 
follower will be more restrictive compare to its Nash equilibrium. 
 
3.3.2 Stackelberg equilibrium with ECB as leader 
 
In this case, the leader’s problem is given by: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]22222222  21min2 yywLr −+−=∆ pipi      (19)  
 
s.t.: 2211 ArAr +∆=∆  
 
where 2w , the weight that the ECB attaches to inflation, is assumed to be greater than unity 
because the European Central Bank is tied by its narrow mandate to “maintain price stability”. 
Solving by substitution and setting the partial derivative with respect to 2r∆  of the leader’s 
objective function equal to zero, we obtain the first- order condition: 
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An interesting aspect of this solution is that both central banks’ reactions to a US asset market 
shock are identical independently of whether they act as leader or follower. The banks’ 
reactions differ significantly in the face of a European asset market shock. 
 
3.4 International non-coordination policy: an evaluation 
 
In the final part of this section we provide an analysis of the outcomes of the Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibria. In figure 1, we depict the change of the US interest rate ( 1r∆ ) on the 
vertical axis and the equivalent change for Europe ( 2r∆ ) on the horizontal axis, their positions 
and slopes follow the solutions of equations (9) and (10). 
The intersection of the two reaction functions denotes the Nash equilibrium (N). The locus of 
points between ΦUS, and ΦEU (respective bliss points), derived when the isoloss curves of the 
two countries are tangential to each other, represents the contract curve.  
We start evaluating these outcomes commencing with the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 
which is reached when there is no incentive for either economy to change its policy position, 
taking the other’s policy as given. Consistent with proposition 1, ECB’s reaction function is 
steeper than that of the FED. This implies that in the presence of a domestic asset market 
shock, the FED will follow a tighter monetary policy compared to the one followed by the 
ECB. 
In the Stackelberg game, one of the two players (the leader) realises that there is a better 
position to be achieved than the Nash equilibrium. This occurs when the leader chooses 
policy assuming that it will influence the policy choice of the follower, and ignoring the 
latter’s choice. Assuming that the FED acts as leader, the Stackelberg equilibrium is denoted 
at point SUS (Fig. 1). At this point the isoloss curve GUS is tangential to ECB’s reaction 
function. This is the closest isoloss curve to point Φus that the US can reach given the whole 
range of possible reactions of Europe. Alternatively when the ECB acts as leader, the 
equivalent Stackelberg equilibrium is point SEU.  
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Comparing the Nash and Stackelberg non-cooperative equilibria, the Stackelberg solution is 
certainly superior when the US acts as leader. However, when the US acts as follower, 
whether the Nash solution dominates the Stackelberg solution will depend crucially upon the 
slope of its reaction function. The greater the slope of the FED’s reaction function, the more 
likely that the Nash solution will be the more desirable of the two. When the ECB acts as 
leader, it achieves a lower isoloss curve compared with the Nash equilibrium. The 
Stackelberg equilibrium is preferable to the Nash even in the case where the ECB acts as 
follower to the FED’s leadership. Both the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are inefficient, as 
they do not lay on the contract curve Φus, ΦUE that is derived from the joint minimization of 
the loss functions.  
 
 
4 Non-cooperative equilibria in the presence of a shock in the US asset market.  
 
In this section we analyse the impact of a shock in the US asset market on domestic and 
foreign monetary policy.  
Consider a positive shock in the US asset market that shifts the FED’s reaction function to the 
right as shown in equation (9). The new Nash equilibrium (fig.2) implies a tighter monetary 
policy for the FED, while for the ECB a less tight monetary policy is required. Table 1 shows 
the impact of this shock on 1r∆  and 2r∆ through the coefficients β1, γ, 1u and γ1e.  
For the FED, the higher the response of asset prices to domestic interest rates (coefficient γ), 
the smaller the required change in the interest rates to re-establish the Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, the required increase in the US rate would vary positively with the size of the 
wealth effect (coefficient β) and the sensitivity of the asset prices (in both countries) to 
domestic and foreign rates (1u and γ1e). The increase in the US rate will be ameliorated the 
higher the response of asset prices to domestic interest rate (coefficient γ).  Considering the 
problem from the ECB’s point of view, whether a positive shock in the US asset market 
requires an easing of monetary stance ( 2r∆ ) will depend upon the coefficients β1, γ, 1u and 
γ1e11.   
What is interesting in this case is that the sign of the partial derivative of 2r∆  with respect to 
β1 that is negative. The greater the impact of wealth in aggregate demand the less able will the 
ECB be to reduce rates. 
The direction of the impact of a shock in the US asset market on 1r∆  when the FED acts as 
leader is, in terms of signs of the coefficients β1, γ, 1u and γ1e, the same as the Nash.  
                                                          
11
 The summary of the results are presented in table 1. 
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The Stackelberg equilibrium is not affected by the shock (fig.2). However, in terms of social 
welfare, the equilibrium now is on a higher isoloss curve compared with the previous FED’s 
reaction function. 
Finally, we consider the Stackelberg EU leader equilibrium and a shock in the US asset 
market. The new equilibrium is worse for Europe compared to the Stackelberg US leader 
equilibrium and, in terms of social welfare, the equilibrium is on a higher isoloss curve 
compared with the previous Stackelberg EU leader equilibrium. 
Moreover, comparing the Nash and Stackelberg non-cooperative equilibria, the Stackelberg 
solution is certainly superior for the FED leader implying a less tight monetary policy. 
However, the Nash solution dominates the Stackelberg solution for the ECB when acts as 
follower.   
 
5 Non-cooperative equilibria in the presence of a shock in the EU asset market.  
 
In this section we analyse the impact of a shocks in the EU asset market on domestic and 
foreign monetary policy.  
Assuming a positive shock in the EU asset market that shifts the ECB’s reaction function to 
the right as shown in equation (10). The new Nash equilibrium (fig.3) implies tighter 
monetary policy for the ECB while for the FED, a less tight monetary policy is required. 
Table 2 shows the impact of this shock on 1r∆  and 2r∆ through the coefficients 1u , γ1e, β1, and 
γ.  
For the ECB, the higher the response of asset prices to domestic interest rates (coefficient γ), 
the smaller the required change in interest rates to re-establish the Nash equilibrium. The 
domestic interest rate will increase and this will have a negative effect on the EU asset 
market. On the other hand, the decrease of the US interest rate will reinforce the negative 
effect for Europe because of the increase in the interest rate differential. Hence, inflation 
pressure may arise.  Moreover, the required increase in the EU interest rate would vary 
positively with the size of the wealth effect (coefficient β) and the sensitivity of asset prices in 
both countries to domestic and foreign rates. However, the sign of the coefficient 1u is 
ambiguous for 
n
r1∆
. Whether the ECB can re-establish the Nash equilibrium depends 
crucially upon value of the coefficient γ.   In fact, the increase in the EU rate will be 
ameliorated the higher the response of asset prices to domestic interest rate (coefficient γ).   
Considering the problem from the FED’s point of view, whether a positive shock in the EU 
asset market requires an easing of monetary stance ( 1r∆ ) will depend upon the coefficients 
β1, γ, 1u and γ1e. 
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Finally, we analyse the impact of the shock in the EU asset market on 1r∆  and 2r∆ through the 
coefficients β1, γ, 1u and γ1e considering the Stackelberg equilibrium when the FED acts as 
leader.  
The Stackelberg equilibrium is affected by the shock (fig.3). The new equilibrium will be at a 
lower level of interest rates for the FED and at a higher level for the ECB. Moreover, in terms 
of social welfare, the equilibrium now is on a lower isoloss curve compared with the previous 
one. In this scenario, the leader has, undoubtedly, an advantage. As matter of fact, the FED 
would set its interest rate at low level in order to aid output to converge to y , whilst the ECB 
is faced with a positive shock in the asset market that requires a rising of the rate with the 
subsequent real economy slowing. Therefore, the follower has to fix the interest rate at a 
higher level compared with the previous Stackelberg equilibrium. Table 2 shows that the 
partial derivatives of 2r∆  with respect to β1 and γ are ambiguous. This cannot allow us to 
interpret the sign of the wealth effect on inflation via the output gap. If, however, the link 
between monetary policy and the EU asset market is weak, then the final benefit for the ECB 
of an increase in the domestic interest rate will depend essentially on the value of the 
coefficient β1. 
If we consider the Stackelberg EU leader equilibrium assuming a shock in the EU asset 
market, the equilibrium is not affected by the shock. However, in terms of social welfare, the 
equilibrium for the leader is on a lower isoloss curve compared with the previous EU reaction 
function. 
Table 3 summarizes and compares all the possible scenarios. In order to simplify the analysis, 
we have defined the choice of the Central Banks as “Most preferred”, “Less preferred” and 
“Least preferred”. 
“Most preferred” is referred to a scenario where both optimal monetary policy ( 1r∆  or 2r∆ ) 
and social loss are minimized; “Less preferred” is referred to a scenario where only one of 
two is minimised and “Least preferred” when neither measure achieve their minimum; 
When we look at the situation in which the FED is facing a shock in the domestic asset 
market, both the players (FED and ECB) would prefer to be the followers. In fact, this is the 
situation in which they minimize their loss functions. However, since the FED is assumed, 
according to its mandate, to be balanced in its pursuit of monetary policy, the Stackelberg 
leader equilibrium could be chosen especially if the shock is not of such a big magnitude that 
could have strong effect on the inflation.  This is clear in the situation in which the ECB is 
facing a shock in its domestic asset market. In this case both Central Banks would prefer the 
scenario where the FED is the leader and the ECB acts as follower. In fact, the optimal 
monetary policy for the leader would imply a lower level of interest rate that could help the 
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economy while for the follower (ECB) the higher level of interest rate could cool down the 
“asset market bubble” reducing the pressure that the wealth effect has on inflation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has re-examined the issue of international macroeconomic policy coordination, 
taking advantage of recent developments in theoretical methods used in the literature to study 
monetary policy optimization. 
All the recent attention on the asset market and on monetary policy rules has inspired a 
natural question: should a central bank also react to asset price movements when it sets its 
monetary policy? The movements in the asset markets have stimulated a great discussion 
among economists about the role the asset market should play in influencing monetary policy 
decisions.  
The review of the literature, however, does not offer a conclusive answer to whether, and 
how, a central bank should respond to asset “shocks”. This paper examines, theoretically, in a 
non-cooperative game framework, the optimal monetary policy assuming that the central 
bank considers the information from the asset market. In particular, we examined the impact 
of shocks in the asset markets on domestic and foreign monetary policy.    
Comparing the Nash and Stackelberg non-cooperative equilibria, the Stackelberg solution is 
dominant for the FED leader compared to the Nash solution. In the all scenarios analyzed, the 
Nash equilibrium for the ECB is the one that allows the central banks to manage the economy 
with the lowest level of interest rates.  
The Stackelberg EU leader equilibrium is worse for Europe compared to the Stackelberg US 
leader and, in terms of social welfare, the equilibrium is on a higher isoloss curve.  
When we analysed the impact of a shock in the EU asset market, the subsequent Nash 
equilibrium implied a tighter monetary policy for the ECB and, a less tight monetary policy 
for the FED. The analysis presents different partial optimal equilibria related to different 
cases where FED is the leader and ECB the follower and vice versa. However, the following 
general conclusion can be achieved. In terms of social welfare, comparing the Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibrium when the ECB is the leader, the Stackelberg US solution is certainly 
superior for the leader because this implies a less tight monetary policy for the US. The same 
conclusion is found for the ECB when it acts as the follower. 
In conclusion, irrespective of where the shocks originate, if the FED would choose the 
Stackelberg leader equilibrium, the ECB would minimaze its social loss and, in the case of a 
shock in the US, at a lower level of interest rate. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 1 Partial derivatives of 1r∆  and 2r∆  with respect to 
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Table 2 Partial derivatives of 1r∆  and 2r∆  with respect to 
1,  1u, 1e, and  assuming a shock in the EU 
Market 
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Table 3 
Stackelberg equilibria Shock in the US Asset Market Shock in the EU Asset Market 
FED Leader 1r∆
 
Social Welfare 1r∆
 
Social Welfare 
 
Unchanged Higher Isoloss 
curve 
Decrease the 
interest rate 
differential 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
 Less Preferred Most Preferred 
ECB Follower 2r∆
 
Social Welfare 2r∆
 
Social Welfare 
 
Decrease the 
interest rate 
differential 
 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
Increase the 
interest rate 
differential 
 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
 
 Most Preferred Less Preferred 
ECB Leader 2r∆
 
Social Welfare 2r∆
 
Social Welfare 
 
Increase the 
interest rate 
differential 
Higher Isoloss 
curve 
 
 
Unchanged 
 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
 
 Least  Preferred Less  Preferred 
FED Follower 1r∆
 
Social Welfare 1r∆
 
Social Welfare 
 
Increase the 
interest rate 
differential 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
 
 
Increase the 
interest rate 
differential 
 
Lower Isoloss 
curve 
 
 Less  Preferred 
 
Less  Preferred 
Legend    
We define the choice of the Central Banks as Most preferred, Less preferred and Least preferred. 
Most preferred is referred to a scenario where both optimal monetary policy and social Loss  are minimized; 
Less preferred  is referred to a scenario where only one of the two is minimized; 
Least preferred is when neither measure achieve their minimum; 
 
Fig. 1 Nash and Stackelberg equilibria 
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Fig. 2 Shock in the US asset market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Shock in the EU asset market 
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